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Conceptualism di¤ers from intuitionism in being a theory about
the construction of concepts and not about the construction of proofs.
Constructive conceptualism is similar to nominalism in excluding an
impredicative comprehension principle, but di¤ers from nominalism
in the kind of ramied predicative logic each validates. Ramied con-
structive conceptualism leads in a natural way to holistic conceptual-
ism, and, unlike nominalism, both can extended to a type of realism in
which some nominalized predicates denote abstract objects. Interme-
diate positions of conceptual realism are distinguished regarding which
concepts can be projected to have abstract objects corresponding to
their nominalizations.
The problem of universals as the problem of what predicates stand for
in meaningful assertions is discussed in contemporary philosophy mainly in
terms of the opposing theories of nominalism and logical realism. Conceptu-
alism, when it is mentioned, is usually identied with intuitionism, which is
not a theory of predication but a theory of the activity of constructing proofs
in mathematics. Both intuitionism and conceptualism are concerned with the
notion of a mental construction, to be sure, and both maintain that there
can be only a potentially innite number of such constructions. But whereas
the focus of concern in intuitionism is with the construction of proofs, in
conceptualism our concern is with the construction of concepts. This dif-
ference sets the two frameworks apart and in pursuit of di¤erent goals, and
in fact it is not at all clear how the notion of a mental construction in the
one framework is related to that in the other. This is especially true insofar
as mathematical objects, according to intuitionism, are nothing but mental
constructions, whereas in conceptualism concepts are anything but objects.
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In any case, whatever the relation between the two, our concern in this paper
is with conceptualism as a philosophical theory of predication and not with
intuitionism as a philosophy of mathematics.
Now conceptualism di¤ers from nominalism insofar as it posits univer-
sals, namely, concepts, as the semantic grounds for the correct or incorrect
application of predicate expressions. Conceptualism di¤ers from logical real-
ism, on the other hand, insofar as the universals it posits are not assumed to
exist independently of the human capacity for thought and representation.
Concepts, in other words, are neither predicate expressions nor independently
real properties and relations. But then, at least for the kind of conceptualism
we have in mind here, neither are they mental images or ideas in the sense of
particular mental occurrences. That is, concepts are not objects (saturated
individuals) but are rather cognitive capacities, or cognitive structures other-
wise based upon such capacities, to identify and classify or characterize and
relate objects in various ways. Concepts, in other words, are intersubjectively
realizable cognitive abilities which may be exercised by di¤erent persons at
the same time as well as by the same person at di¤erent times. It is for this
reason that we speak of concepts as objective universals, even though they
are not independently real properties and relations.
As cognitive structures, concepts in the sense intended here are not Fregean
concepts (which for Frege are independently real unsaturated functions from
objects to truth values). But they may be modeled by the latter (assuming
that there are Fregean concepts to begin with) especially since as cognitive
capacities which need not be exercised at any given time (or even ever for
that matter), concepts in the sense intended here also have an unsaturated
nature corresponding to, albeit di¤erent from, the unsaturated nature of
Fregean concepts. Thus, in particular, the saturation (or exercise) of a con-
cept in the sense intended here results not in a truth value but a mental act,
and, if overtly expressed, a speech act as well. The unsaturatedness of a con-
cept consists in this regard in its non-occurrent or purely dispositional status
as a cognitive capacity, and it is the exercise (or saturation) of this capacity
as a cognitive structure which informs particular mental acts with a predica-
ble nature (or with a referential nature in the case of concepts corresponding
to quantier expressions).
In regard to the construction of concepts, or what is usually called concept-
formation, we distinguish two major types or forms of conceptualism, which
we shall call constructive and holistic conceptualism, respectively. Construc-
tive conceptualism, as we shall see, has a¢ nities with nominalism with which
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it is sometimes confused, especially because both validate only a predicative
logic with a restricted form of comprehension principle. Holistic conceptu-
alism, on the other hand, has a¢ nities with logical realism with which it in
turn is sometimes confused insofar as both similarly validate an unrestricted
or impredicative comprehension principle. Holistic conceptualism is not op-
posed to constructive conceptualism, it should be noted, even though a strict
form of the latter will reject even the possibility of impredicative concept-
formation. Such a strict form of constructive conceptualism will maintain
that all concept-formation must be in accord with the so-called vicious-circle
principle that concepts cannot be constructed or formed in a manner that
involves or presupposes a totality to which they belong or form a part. Holis-
tic conceptualism does violate this principle, but in doing so it presupposes
the construction of predicative concepts that are in accord with the principle
and that form the basis of the process which leads to impredicative concept-
formation. (We shall hereafter refer to the concepts which can be formed
in constructive conceptualism as predicative concepts.) For this reason we
shall be primarily concerned in this paper with the construction of a logic
for constructive conceptualism and only secondarily with how this logic is
to be extended to the impredicative logic of holistic conceptualism without
nullifying the constructive nature of the predicative concepts it posits.
The PoincareRussell vicious-circle principle is interpreted in conceptu-
alism as a principle about concept-formation, it should be emphasized, and
not about the introduction of new objects. This is because concepts are not
objects to begin with, and a pattern of concept-formation that is in accord
with the vicious-circle principle will involve only the construction of concepts
and not the introduction of new objects. There is a realist counterpart to the
vicious-circle principle, however, and this counterpart does involve conceptu-
alism insofar as the objects in question are introduced only in a manner that
correlates them with concepts the way classes, for example, are correlated
with the concepts whose extensions they are. Such objects might not be
classes, of course, but whatever they are we shall associate the correlation in
question with the nominalization transformation of predicates into abstract
singular terms. It is in its account of nominalized predicates, in other words,
that constructive conceptualism also provides an account of the realist coun-
terpart of the vicious-circle principle. We shall refer to the assumption that
nominalized predicates actually denote as conceptual realism (or even con-
ceptual Platonism if the objects in question are assumed to be the properties
and relations we purport to denote with the nominalized predicates of natural
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language). Following Frege, we shall refer to the objects denoted by nomi-
nalized predicates as concept-correlates. As part of our goal of constructing a
logic for constructive conceptualism, accordingly, we shall also be concerned
with developing within this framework a logic of nominalized predicates.
1 Nominalism versus Conceptualism as Pred-
icative Second-Order Logics
The basic principle of standard predicative second-order logic is the restricted
comprehension principle:
(CP!) (9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ '];
where F is an n-place predicate variable that does not occur in ', and ' is a
formula in which no predicate variable has a bound occurrence, and x1;:::;xn
are pairwise distinct individual variables. Though this principle appears to
posit a universal corresponding to any rst-order formula, it need in fact
involve no universals beyond rst-order formulas themselves. That is, by
interpreting the predicate quantier substitutionally, (CP!) will not involve
us in any ontological commitments beyond those we are already committed
to in our use of rst-order formulas. It is in this sense that nominalism can
be said to validate (CP!) and in fact provide a semantics with respect to
which standard predicative second-order logic is complete.1
In constructive conceptualism, however, predicate quantiers are inter-
preted referentially and not substitutionally, and this di¤erence is reected
in the kind of predicative logic that is validated. Consider, for example, an
applied theory with E as a 2-place predicate constant and the following as
an axiom:
(A) (8F )(9y)(8x)[E(x; y)$ F (x)]:
In standard predicative second-order logic, (A) leads directly to Russells
paradox by simply substituting :E(x; x) for F . Yet in constructive concep-
tualism (A) is not inconsistent and may be interpreted as simply stipulating
that every predicative concept has an extension (a basic thesis of conceptual
realism).
1See Cocchiarella [2] for a semantics and proof of completeness.
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It is not the principle (CP!) that is validated in constructive conceptual-
ism, in other words, but the somewhat more restricted principle:
(CCP!) (8G1):::(8Gk)(9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ '];
where (1) ' is a pure second-order formula (i.e., one in which no non-logical
constants occur), (2) F is an n-place predicate variable such that neither it
nor the identity sign occur in ', (3) ' is predicative in nominalisms purely
grammatical sense (i.e., no predicate variable has a bound occurrence in '),
(4) G1; :::; Gk are all of the distinct predicate variables occurring (free) in
', and (5) x1; :::; xn are pairwise distinct individual variables. Otherwise
than replacing (CP!) by (CCP!), we may assume that the (unramied) pred-
icative second-order logic of constructive conceptualism consists of the same
axioms and rules as standard predicative second-order logic. We will use ` c,
however, to signify the derivability relation of this nonstandard predicative
second-order logic.2
Now it is clear of course that by clause (3) every instance of (CCP!) is
also an instance of (CP!) (because universal generalizations of instances of
axiom schemes are also assumed to be instances of those schemes). The
converse, however, does not hold; i.e., not every instance of (CP!) is also
an instance of (CCP!). The important di¤erences are that in (CP!) the
initial quantiers regarding all of the predicate variables occurring free in
the comprehending formula ' are not required as a necessary condition and
that ' need not be a pure second-order formula in which the identity sign does
not occur. That is, in (CP!), but not (CCP!), ' may contain occurrences of
the identity sign as well as of any of the predicate constants of the language
or applied theory in question. This is allowed in nominalism because in
that framework predicate quantiers are interpreted only substitutionally,
and in particular as having rst-order formulas as their substituends. It
is not acceptable in constructive conceptualism where predicate quantiers
are interpreted referentially and where it is not assumed that any rst-order
formula, and especially not an identity formula, will stand for a predicative
concept merely because it is a rst-order formula. Thus, in particular, what
follows in constructive conceptualism regarding the predicate constant or
rst-order formula involved in (A) above is that as posited in (A) such an
2See Cocchiarella [3], Chapter 2, for a more detailed discussion of this nonstandard
predicative second-order logic.
5
expression cannot stand for a predicative (relational) concept. That is,
(A) `c :(9R)(8x)(8y)[R(x; y)$ E(x; y)]:
Constructive conceptualism, in other words, is free of existential presuppo-
sitionsregarding predicate constants (and variables), and in that regard it
is free of the presupposition that any formula that is predicative in nominal-
isms purely grammatical sense must for that reason stand for a value of the
bound predicate variables.
Of course if '(x1; :::xn) is a rst-order formula of an applied theory 
such that (1) the identity sign does not occur in ' and (2) for each k-place
predicate constant P that occurs in ', for all k 2 !,
 `c (9G)(8x1):::; (8xk)[G(x1; :::; xk)$ P (x1; :::; xk)];
then it is provable in constructive conceptualism that '(x1; :::; xn) stands for
a predicative concept in the context represented by , i.e.,
 `c (9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ ']:
What determines which of the predicate constants of  stand for predica-
tive concepts and which, if any, do not will of course depend on s domain
of discourse and on how that domain is to be conceptually represented. The
primitive predicate constants of  that are understood to stand for predica-
tive concepts will then be stipulated as doing so in terms of the meaning
postulatesof .
Another way of seeing the di¤erence between the predicative logics of
nominalism and constructive conceptualism is in the role that free predicate
variables have in each. In nominalism, of course, free predicate variables
are construed as dummy schema letters standing for arbitrary rst-order
formulas. This means that the substitution rule (where G is a free n-place
predicate variable),
if ` '; then ` '[ =G(x1; :::; xn)];
is valid in standard predicative second-order logic only when  is predica-
tive in nominalisms purely grammatical sense, i.e., only when no predicate
variable has a bound occurrence in  . The rule is not derivable in standard
predicative second-order logic when  contains bound predicate variables,
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and in fact if such an extension of the rule were allowed in this logic, then
because
(9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ G(x1; :::; xn)]
is an instance of (CP!) we would be able to derive the full unrestricted im-
predicative comprehension principle. In the predicative logic of constructive
conceptualism, however, the extended substitution rule is not only accept-
able but is even derivable (by a simple induction on the proof of '), and
without having the impredicative comprehension principle as a consequence
(because the above instance of (CP!) is not also an instance of (CCP!)). This
means that the notion of a possible (explicit) denition of a predicate con-
stant is broader in constructive conceptualism than it is in nominalism where
only rst-order formulas are allowed as deniens. That is, the validity of the
extended rule of substitution in constructive conceptualism shows us that de-
nitions in this framework whose deniens contain bound predicate variables
will still be noncreative and will still allow for the provable eliminability
of dened predicate constants. Thus, it is only by confusing nominalism
with constructive conceptualism that one can maintain that concepts are ad-
missible in constructive conceptualism insofar as they are representable by
denable predicates.
One important consequence of these di¤erences that should be especially
noted here, incidentally, is the irreducibility of identity in the predicative
logic that is validated by constructive conceptualism as opposed to its re-
ducibility in principle in the predicative logic that is validated by nominalism.
In particular, while both will agree that any applied theory will contain at
most nitely many predicate constants, only nominalism can maintain that
the formula representing indiscernibility with respect to these nitely many
predicate constants is itself a predicative formula and that such indiscernibil-
ity su¢ ces in principle for full substitutivity. That is, as far as nominalism
is concerned, the identity sign can be eliminated in any applied context in
favor of the indiscernibility formula regarding the nitely many predicate
constants of the theory describing that context (cp. Quine [7], p. 63f). It
is in fact for this reason that nominalism can validate (CP!) even when the
identity sign occurs in the comprehending formula.
None of this holds in constructive conceptualism, however, because in
general indiscernibility with respect to all of the nitely many predicate con-
stants of a given theory will not amount to a predicative formula; i.e., in
general such a formula will not stand for a predicative concept. Moreover,
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even if it were stipulated in meaning postulates that all of the predicate con-
stants of an applied theory stand for predicative concepts, the indiscernibility
formula with respect to those constants would still not su¢ ce for full sub-
stitutivity in complex formulas that do not stand for predicative concepts.
The identity sign, in other words, is not eliminable or otherwise reducible
in constructive conceptualism; and because identity allows for the full sub-
stitutivity of singular terms even in impredicative contexts, then an identity
formula will not in general stand for a predicative concept, which is why the
identity sign is not allowed to occur in instances of (CCP!). Thus, whereas
x = y $ (8F )[F (x)$ F (y)]
is provable in the standard predicative second-order logic that is validated by
nominalism, the right-to-left direction of this same formula is not provable
in constructive conceptualisms nonstandard predicative second-order logic.
2 Ramied Constructive Conceptualism
The di¤erences between nominalism and constructive conceptualism noted so
far are di¤erences of logistic and not of notation. This is no longer so when we
turn to ramied second-order logic. Thus the sort of ramication validated
in nominalism is one that begins with a language for standard predicative
second-order logic and that proceeds from there through a potential innity
of languages L1; :::; Ln; :::(n 2 !) where the predicate variables of Lj+1 have
the formulas of Lj as their substituends and where the predicate quantiers
binding those variables are interpreted substitutionally with respect to their
substituends. These languages can be cumulative, but since the formulas
of Lj may contain bound occurrences of predicate variables, the predicate
variables (and constants) of Lj+1 will have to be distinguished from those of
Lj.
This need for distinct predicate variables for each language Lj does not
arise in constructive conceptualism, on the other hand, and this is because
predicate quantiers are interpreted referentially and not substitutionally in
this framework. The sort of ramication validated in constructive concep-
tualism, in other words, is not based on a sequence of languages in which
predicate quantiers are interpreted substitutionally but on a potentially in-
nite sequence of stages of concept-formation where the concepts constructed
or formed at one stage become the contents of the concepts constructed or
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formed at the next. These stages are cumulative and what is added at each
stage j + 1 beyond the initial stage of the predicative concepts of an applied
theory are concepts whose construction involves a reference to the totality of
concepts constructible at the jth stage. These new concepts are themselves
predicative, according to constructive conceptualism, insofar as they do not
involve or presuppose any reference to their own totality, i.e., insofar as they
are formed in accordance with the vicious-circle principle.
But now since free predicate variables will have at any given stage arbi-
trary formulas as their substituends, including formulas that contain pred-
icate quantiers that refer to concepts formed at stages presupposing that
stage, what is required is not a di¤erent type of predicate variable for each
stage but a di¤erent type of predicate quantier. In other words, instead of
a sequence of di¤erent types of predicate variable for each of nominalisms
languages L1; :::; Lj; :::(j 2 ! f0g), what is required in constructive concep-
tualism is a sequence of di¤erent quantier signs 81; :::;8j; :::(j 2 !   f0g)
that can all be a¢ xed to the same predicate variables. (We understand (9jF )
to abbreviate :(8jF ):.) The predicate quantier (8jF ), where F is an arbi-
trary n-place predicate variable, will then be understood to refer in a given
applied theory to all of the n-ary predicative concepts that can be formed in
that theory at the jth stage of the potentially innite sequence of stages of
concept-formation in question.
Thus, as applied at the jth stage, the pattern of concept-formation that
in constructive conceptualism is to be in accord with the vicious-circle prin-
ciple may be described as the following ramied conceptualist comprehension
principle:
(RCCP!) (8jG1):::(8jGk)(9jF )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ '];
where (1) ' is a pure ramied formula (i.e., one in which no nonlogical
constants occur) in which the identity sign does not occur, (2) F is an n-
place predicate variable not occurring free in ', (3) no predicate variable
is bound in ' by a quantier of a stage  j (i.e., for all i  j, 8i does
not occur in '), (4) G1; :::; Gk are all of the predicate variables occurring
free in ', and (5) x1; :::; xn pairwise distinct individual variables. Note that
because the stages of concept-formation are cumulative, ramied constructive
conceptualism validates the following axiom schema where i  j:
(8jF )'! (8iF )':
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3 From Constructive to Holistic Conceptual-
ism
The nonstandard ramied second-order logic described above di¤ers from
standard ramied second-order logic in essentially the same way that the
nonstandard predicative second-order logic described earlier di¤ers from stan-
dard predicative second-order logic.3 This di¤erence arises, of course, not
only because predicate quantiers are interpreted referentially in construc-
tive conceptualism but also because the referential logic validated by this
framework is free of existential presuppositionsregarding predicate expres-
sions. In other words, the grammatical predicativity of the deniens for a
new predicate constant of an applied context will not always coincide in con-
structive conceptualism with semantical predicativity in the sense of actually
standing for a predicative concept of a given stage of concept-formation re-
garding that context. Such a situation cannot arise in nominalism, of course,
precisely because, given nominalisms substitutional interpretation of pred-
icate quantiers, semantical predicativity is none other than grammatical
predicativity.
Note by way of contrast that because rst-order quantiers are interpreted
referentially in nominalism as well as in conceptualism, we may assume that
the rst-order logic that is validated in either or both of these frameworks is
free of existential presuppositionsregarding singular terms. Indeed, such an
assumption is particularly appropriate in any extension of the ramied logic
of either of these frameworks that allows nominalized predicates to occur as
abstract singular terms. In this way, either or both may assume what we call
the Abelardian thesis that nominalized predicates in fact denote nothing.
Independently of the existential presuppositions regarding singular terms,
the di¤erence between grammatical and semantical predicativity that results
from the freedom of such presuppositions for predicate expressions corre-
sponds in constructive conceptualism to the idea that concept-formation is
essentially an open process. Indeed, this openness, as represented by a gap
between semantical and grammatical predicativity, constitutes in conceptual-
ism in general a kind of conceptual tension or disequilibrium in the structure
of concepts that is the motivating or driving force of the pattern of reective
abstraction in which concepts constructed or formed at one stage become
the basis of the concepts constructed or formed at the next. Thus, formulas
3See Church [1], § 58, for a formulation of standard ramied second order logic.
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that are grammatically but not semantically predicative at a given stage of
concept-formation may become semantically predicative at the next stage,
thereby closing the gap as it were between semantical and grammatical
predicativity at the preceding stage. But because that closure will involve
introducing new predicate quantiers corresponding to the idea of taking all
of the concepts of the preceding stage as referents, there will then be new
formulas at the next stage that are grammatically but not semantically pred-
icative. In this way, the conceptual tension or disequilibrium between gram-
matical and semantical predicativity will continue on indenitely through all
of the potentially innite number of stages of concept-formation in question.
On the other hand, because there is no such di¤erence between grammati-
cal and semantical predicativity in nominalism, one can only wonder at what
motivates a nominalistic construction of standard ramied second-order logic.
Whatever the motivation in nominalism, it is clear that what moves us
from one stage of concept-formation to the next in constructive conceptu-
alism is a drive for a closure in which grammatical predicativity nally co-
incides with semantical predicativity. Such a closure cannot be realized in
constructive conceptualism, of course, because it amounts in e¤ect to a viola-
tion of the vicious-circle principle, and being in accord with the vicious-circle
principle is the one constraint that characterizes the construction of con-
cepts in constructive conceptualism. In holistic conceptualism, however, this
constraint is violated, or rather transcended, by the allowance for an ide-
alized transition to a limit where impredicative concept-formation becomes
possible. Such an idealized transition is conceptually similar to, but ontolog-
ically di¤erent from, an actual transition to a limit at an innite or !-stage of
concept-formation that is the summation of all of the nite stages. Of course,
there cannot really be an innite stage of concept-formation for concepts as
cognitive capacities, which is why an idealized transition to a limit should
not be confused with an actual transition. This is not to say, on the other
hand, that there cannot be an actual transition to a limit regarding all of the
classes that are the extensions of the predicative concepts constructed at each
nite stage. But such an actual transition is a realist posit regarding classes
as objects and should not be confused with an idealized transition regarding
the process of concept-formation. In fact, the realist posit may even be in
accord with the realist counterpart of the vicious-circle principle, in which
case classes might also be posited corresponding to an !+1 stage, and then
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corresponding to an !+2 stage, and so on for each recursive ordinal .4 An
idealized transition regarding the process of concept-formation, on the other
hand, is a conceptual transition based on some form of closure, or equilibra-
tion of cognitive structure, which in the present case is a closure in which
grammatical predicativity coincides with semantical predicativity.5 Such a
closure is opposed to the whole idea of further stages of concept-formation
that are themselves based on the drive for closure, and in that regard an ideal-
ized transition transcends rather than rejects the vicious-circle principle. Of
course, such a transcendence amounts to the validation of an impredicative
comprehension principle as well; but such a validation should not be con-
fused with the di¤erent validation of that principle in logical realism where
it is assumed that properties and relations exist independently of all concept-
formation. Nor should it be confused with the realist posit that classes exist
corresponding to all concepts, predicative or otherwise.
Finally, it should be noted that impredicative concept-formation is based
not only on the nite stages of concept-formation described in ramied con-
structive conceptualism but also on the capacity humans have for language
as well. This is because the closure where grammatical predicativity coin-
cides with semantical predicativity, and which is the basis of the idealized
transition to a limit leading to impredicative concept-formation, is a closure
regarding the interconnectedness of language and thought. In this regard,
impredicative concept-formation is a mediated process, and language and
the linguistic ability to use predicate expressions is the means used to master
and direct such a process. This does not amount to a compromise between
holistic conceptualism and nominalism, however, for even though grammati-
cal predicativity coincides with semantical predicativity in both frameworks,
in nominalism semantical predicativity is none other than grammatical pred-
icativity. Also, unlike holistic conceptualism, nominalism cannot validate an
impredicative comprehension principle. Nominalism also di¤ers from con-
structive conceptualism in this regard, because unlike the latter it does not
4Wangs hierarchy of systems  in [8], chapter 23, is precisely such a framework based on
the realist counterpart of the vicious-circle principle. Wang does not describe his hierarchy
this way, it should be noted, but that is because he conates the vicious-circle principle
as a principle about concept-formation with its realist counterpart. Strictly speaking, for
each recursive ordinal ,  is actually a type-theoretical set theory based on the realist
counterpart of the vicious-circle principle.
5See Piaget [6] for a general discussion of the equilibration of cognitive structures by
means of a closure involving an idealized transition to a limit.
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validate a ramied logic that has a natural extension to an impredicative
logic that is validated by an interpretation that presupposes the way the
ramied logic that it contains is validated.
4 Ramied Constructive Conceptualism with
Nominalized Predicates
There are two sorts of ways in which higher-orderlogic is involved in con-
ceptualism. The rst is in the order of the stages of concept-formation that
are generated in ramied constructive conceptualism where the concepts that
are constructed or formed at one stage become the contents of the concepts
constructed or formed at the next. This notion of higher-orderis properly
formulated as a ramied second-order logic. The second is the distinction
between the occurrence of predicates as predicates and their occurrence as
abstract singular terms. Strictly speaking, of course, predicates are not them-
selves singular terms but can be formally transformed into such by deletion
of the argument or subject positions that come with them in their role as
predicates. Traditionally, this transformation is marked by a deletion of the
parentheses (and commas in the case of a relational predicate) that precede
and succeed (or separate in the case of commas) the singular terms to which
the predicates can be applied. Thus whereas F (x) and R(x; y) are formulas
in which F and R occur as predicates, G(F ) and G(R) are formulas in which
F and R occur as singular terms. In F (F ) and R(F;R), of course, F and R
occur both as predicates and as singular terms though no single occurrence
can be both as a predicate and as a singular term. We shall retain this tra-
ditional practice here when marking the transformation of a predicate into a
singular term, or what we also call its nominalization.
Now in this second notion of higher-order logic, predicates were tra-
ditionally allowed to occur as singular terms only of predicates that were
assigned a higher orderthan the predicates themselves. This led to a gram-
matically stratied hierarchy of predicates and singular terms in which for-
mulas such as F (F ) and R(F;R) were said to be meaningless. Such a gram-
matical stratication is really unnecessary, however, and the reason why it
was originally incorporated was based on a confusion between the concepts
predicates stand for in their role as predicates and the objects that their nom-
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inalized forms denote as singular terms.6 Keeping this distinction in mind,
we need only extend the ramied second-order logic already described so as
to allow for the occurrence of nominalized predicates as singular terms on a
par with individual variables.
Actually, we also need something like Churchs -operator for the forma-
tion of complex predicates as well. Thus where ' is a formula, we also have
[x']( ) as a complex predicate (note the accompanying pair of parentheses)
and [x'] as a complex singular term. For convenience, however, we shall
usually drop the accompanying parentheses (and commas) when referring
to predicates, though always, whenever a predicate occurs in a formula as
a predicate, it will have an accompanying pair of parentheses (and commas
as well if it is a relational predicate). We also adopt Freges terminology
here and refer to the objects (if any) denoted by nominalized predicates as
concept-correlates.
In describing our logical grammar, we shall for convenience identify the
di¤erent types of meaningful expressions by identifying them with di¤erent
natural numbers. Thus, we shall understand 0 to represent the type of all
singular terms, or what for brevity we will simply call terms. We then take
1 to be the type of all well-formed formulas (w¤s) and n + 1, for n > 0, to
be the type of all n-place predicate expressions. We assume the availability
of denumerably many individual variables, and, for each natural number n,
denumerably many n-place predicate variables. (We identify propositional
variables with 0-place predicate variables.) We shall use x, y, z, with or
without numerical subscripts, to refer (in the metalanguage) to individual
variables, and similarly we use F n, Gn,Rn, to refer to n-place predicate
variables. (We shall usually drop the superscript when the context makes
clear the degree of a predicate variable or when it otherwise does not matter
what degree it is.) We shall also use u to refer to variables in general,
and aand bto refer to singular terms in general. We take !, :, =, 8,
, and, for each positive integer j, 8j as logical constants, and we assume
the others to be dened (as abbreviations of the metalanguage) in the usual
way. We recursively dene, for each natural number n, the set of meaningful
expressions of type n, in symbols MEn, as follows:
1. every individual variable (or constant) is in ME0, and every n-place
predicate variable (or constant) is in both MEn+1and ME0;
6For a more detailed discussion involved in this confusion, see Cocchiarella [4] and [5].
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2. if a; b 2ME0, then (a = b) 2ME1;
3. if  2MEn+1, and a1; :::; an 2 ME0, then (a1; :::; an) 2ME1;
4. if ' 2 ME1, and x1; :::; xn are pairwise distinct individual variables,
then [x1:::xn'] 2MEn+1;
5. if ' 2ME1, then :' 2ME1;
6. if ';  2ME1, then ('!  ) 2ME1;
7. if ' 2 ME1, x is an individual variable, F is a predicate variable, and
j is a positive integer, then (8x)', (8jx)', (8jF )' 2ME1;
8. if ' 2ME1, then ['] 2ME0; and
9. if n > 1, then MEn ME0.
As indicated, ME0 is the set of terms, and for n > 0, MEn+1 is the set of
n-place predicate expressions. W¤s or propositional forms are of course the
members ofME1. Note that whereas by clause (9) every predicate expression
is (or rather can be transformed into) a term, not every w¤ is a term. Of
course, by clause (4), where n = 0, ['] is a w¤ if ' is a w¤, and by clause
(8) ['] is a term. In other words, besides 0-place predicate variables (and
constants), w¤s are terms only when prexed by the -operator. (We read
['] as that 'when it occurs as a term.)
Note that we apply the quantier 8j to individual as well as predicate
variables. Where a is a singular term, the w¤ (9jx)(a = x) is understood to
express the idea that the object denoted by a is the correlate of a predicative
concept that can be constructed or formed (at least) at the jth stage of
concept-formation. (In the monadic fragment of the logic described below,
(8jx)' can be dened as (8x)[(9jF )(x = F ) ! '], where F is a 1-place
predicate variable. This denition is not available here because relational
concepts also have concept-correlates.)
In describing the axioms and rules of the higher-order logic validated
by constructive conceptualism, we assume that the notions of bondage and
freedom and proper substitution are dened in the usual way. Following
our practice in previous papers, we shall add a superscripted -label to all
theses that are understood to include w¤s having nominalized predicates as
singular terms among their instances. By Leibnizs law, (LL), understood as
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extended in this way, we note that the ramied conceptualist comprehension
principle (RCCP!) described earlier (but now prexed by (8iy1):::(8iym) as
well) can be derived from the following somewhat simpler form:
(RCCP!) (8iy1):::(8iym)(8jG1):::(8jGk)(9jF )([x1:::xn'] = F );
where (1) ' is a w¤ in which no nonlogical constants occur and in which
the identity sign does not occur, (2) F is an n-place predicate variable not
occurring free in ', (3) for all i  j, 8i does not occur in ', and (4) G1; :::; Gk
are all of the pairwise distinct predicate variables occurring free in ', and
y1; :::; ym; x1; :::; xn are all of the pairwise distinct individual variables occur-
ring free in '.
We will call the system consisting of (RCCP!) and the following axioms
and inference rules RC (for the -version of ramied constructive conceptu-
alism). Where u is a predicate or an individual variable, these other axioms
are as follows:
(A0) all tautologous w¤s,
(A1) (8x)('!  )! ((8x)'! (8x) ),
(A2) (8ju)('!  )! ((8ju)'! (8ju) ),
(A3) '! (8x)'; where x is not free in ',
(A4) '! (8ju)', where u is not free in ',
(A5) (8ju)'! (8iu)', where i  j,
(A6) (a = a), where a is a term,
(A7) (8x)(9y)(x = y),
(A8) (8jx)(9y)(x = y),
(A9) (8jx)(9jy)(x = y),
(LL*) (a = b)! ('!  ), where a; b are terms and  comes from ' by
replacing one or more free occurrences of b
by free occurrences of a,
(Id) [x1:::xnR(x1; :::; xn)] = R, where R is an n-place predicate
variable (or constant),
(9=-Conv) [x1:::xn'](a1; :::an)$ (9x1):::(9xn)(a1 = x1 ^ :::^
an = xn ^ '),
where no xi is free in any aj, for 1  i  j,
(RW) [x1:::xn'] = [y1:::yn'(y1=x1; :::; yn=xn)], where no yi occurs in
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', for 1  i  n.
As inference rules we take modus ponens,
(MP) if `rc ' and `rc ('!  ), then `rc  ,
and universal generalization with respect to an individual or predicate vari-
able,
(UG) if `rc ', then ` (8x)', ` (8jx)' and `rc (8jF )'.
We take ` rcto stand for the derivability relation of RC.
Note that by (LL), (UG), (MP) and other axioms, the laws of universal
instantiation are qualied as follows (where x is not free in a, F is not free
in ', and the substitutions are proper):
(9=UI0) ` (9x)(a = x)! [(8x) !  (a=x)],
(9=UI0=j) `rc (9jx)(a = x)! [(8jx) !  (a=x)],
(9=Ulj) (9jF )([x1:::xn'] = F )! ((8jF ) !  ([x1:::xn']=F ));
Also, by (RCCP!), (A5
), (Id) and (LL
), the cumulative nature of the
concepts constructed at each stage is seen in the following theorem of RC
(where F and G are both n-place predicate variables):
`rc (8iG)(9jF )(G = F ); where i  j:
That concept-correlates are also cumulative is seen in the following conse-
quence of (A5) and (A9):
`rc (8ix)(9jy)(x = y); where i  j:
5 Aberlardian Conceptualism versus Concep-
tual Realism
Predicative concepts, it must be emphasized, are unsaturated cognitive ca-
pacities, and in that regard they cannot be the objects (if any) denoted
by nominalized predicates. Nevertheless, by a development of the interplay
between language and thought, predicative concepts as cognitive capacities
can be transformed into secondary or derived abilities that enable us to apply
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these same concepts in a denotative manner corresponding to the use of nom-
inalized predicates in natural language. It is by means of such a secondary or
derived application, in particular, that we purport to refer to independently
real properties and relations (or Platonic forms) as the denotata of nominal-
ized predicates. Thus, for example, not only do we predicate of a shape that
it is triangular and of a person that he is wise by applying a predicative con-
cept in each case, but, in addition, we also purport to denote the properties
of triangularity and wisdom, respectively, by applying these same concepts
denotatively.
Now purporting to denote and actually denoting do not as always coin-
cide, and in fact, despite all our purportings, there may be no independently
real properties or relations at all that are actually denoted by any nominal-
ized predicates. Such a view was apparently maintained by the medieval
philosopher Peter Abelard who is usually described as a nominalist but who
in fact seems really to have been a conceptualist of the sort we have in mind
here. Thus, in particular, Abelard apparently agrees that individuals can
fall under the same universal concept, but he refuses to grant that such a
concept is a thing; that is, that it too is an individual. In any case, whether
nominalist or conceptualist, Abelards view of nominalized predicates can be
represented by means of the following schema:
(Abelard) :(9y)([x1:::xn'] = y):
Our point here is that (Abelard) can be consistently added to RC.
There is a realist alternative to the Abelardian view, however, and this
alternative corresponds in its way to a realist counterpart of the vicious-circle
principle. In particular, by assuming that each predicative concept that is
constructed in accordance with (RCCP!) has a concept-correlate, we in e¤ect
transform the vicious-circle principle as a principle regarding the process of
concept-formation into its realist counterpart regarding the introduction of
new objects. The realist counterpart of the vicious-circle principle, in other
words, may be represented in RC by the introduction of the following axiom
schema:
(A10) (8jF )(9jx)(F = x), for all j 2 !   f0g.
We shall refer to the result of adding (A10) to the axioms of RC as realist
ramied conceptualism, or simply RRC.
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Note that with (A10) we can now prove that the Russellian concept of
being an object correlated with a concept formed at the jth stage and under
which that object does not fall is not a concept that can itself be formed
until after the jth stage. That is, for all i  j,
:(9jF )([x(9jG)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F )
is provable in RCC
Note that where membership is dened at the jth stage as follows,
2j=df [xy(9jF )(y = F ^ F (x))]
the principle (A) cited in section one to the e¤ect that every predicative con-
cept (of what was at that point the rst stage) has a corresponding extension
is now provable. That is,
(8jF )(9y)(8x)[x 2j y $ F (x)]
is provable in RRC. Speaking of membership here of course suggests that
concept-correlates are none other than the extensions of concepts, which in
fact is precisely Freges own interpretation of nominalized predicates (cf. [4],
§§45). Such an interpretation of course also suggests assuming the following
principle of extensionality (for all n 2 !):
(Ext) (8x1):::(8xn)('$  )! [x1:::xn'] = [x1:::xn ]:
We will not make this assumption here ourselves, however, but leave it as
but one of several alternative ways to extend RRC. Another alternative
of course is to take the objects correlated with concepts to be intensional
entities, and in fact to be the properties and relations that we purport to
denote by means of the nominalized predicates of natural language. Classes
as the extensions of concepts can then be reduced to intensional entities in
one or another of the usual ways.
6 The Axiom of Reducibility
In formulating his original theory of ramied types, Russell found that in
order to develop a theory of classes within that theory he needed an axiom
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of reducibility. This axiom has essentially the same form in RRC that it has
in standard ramied second-order logic:
(Red) (8jG)(91F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ G(x1; :::; xn)]
In other words, according to (Red), any predicative concept that can be con-
structed at the jth stage of concept-formation is co-extensive with some con-
cept that can be constructed at the initial or rst stage of concept-formation.
Note that without assuming the principle of extensionality, (Ext), the ax-
iom of reducibility does not nullify the vicious-circle principle as it applies to
the process of concept-formation, since the predicative concepts in question
are only assumed to be co-extensive and not also identical. In other words,
without (Ext) the axiom of reducibility does not imply
(8jG)(91F )(G = F )
in RCC.
Adding (Red) to RRC does result in an extensional impredicative com-
prehension principle, however, and so the question naturally arises as to
whether Russells paradox is derivable in RRC on the basis of (Red). The
answer is that it is not, and in fact RRC + (Red) can be proved to be
consistent in a nitistic proof-theoretic manner.
In regard rst to Russells paradox, note that
(91F )(8x)[F (x)$ :x(x)]
is not well-formed in RCC. For whereas predicate variables can be nomi-
nalized and allowed to occur as singular terms, individual variables cannot
be predicativizedand allowed to occur as predicates. Of course we do have
(91F )(8x)[F (x)$ x =21 x]
as well-formed, and one might perhaps think that a singular terms occur-
ring to the right of 21is an indirect way to predicativizethat singular term.
Nevertheless, the above w¤ is not derivable in RRC + (Red), because by
denition x =21 x is really :(91F )[x = F ^ F (x)], and, because of the pres-
ence of the identity sign, this w¤ is not allowed to occur in any instance of
(RCCP!). In other words, here with 21we have an example of a denable
predicate constant that does not stand for a predicative concept.
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Besides obtaining an extensional impredicative comprehension principle
for the development of a theory of classes, Russell also used his reducibility
axiom to justify his denition of identity as indiscernibility with respect to
the initial predicative concepts. Thus, given the following denition,
x  y =df (81F )[F (x)$ F (y)];
Russells view can be reformulated here as the claim that = can be eliminated
in RRC in favor of  on the basis of (Red). Such a reduction fails in RRC
+ (Red), however. For although
(91F )(8x)(F (x)$ (91G)[x  G ^ :G(x)])
is derivable is derivable in RRC + (Red), what follows is not Russells para-
dox but only that some predicative concepts have indiscernible correlates
even though the concepts themselves are not co-extensive with respect to
those correlates. That is,
(91F )(91G)[F  G ^ F (F ) ^ :G(F )];
and therefore
(91F )(91G)(F  G ^ :(8x)[F (x)$ G(x)])
as well are provable in RRC + (Red). But, by (LL), identity su¢ ces
for co-extensivity, and therefore it is provable in RRC + (Red) that some
predicative concepts have correlates that are indiscernible but not identical.
More specically,
(9x)(9y)(x  y ^ x 6= y)
is provable in RRC + (Red). Thus, instead of providing a basis by which
identity might be reduced to indiscernibility with respect to the predicative
concepts, (Red) actually leads to the refutation of such a reduction.
Now because it is refutable on the basis of (Red) that identity is reducible
to indiscernibility with respect to the predicative concepts, it is also refutable
on the basis of (Red) that some predicative relational concept corresponds
to or otherwise stands for identity. That is,
:(9jR)(8x)[R(x; y)$ x = y]
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is provable in RRC + (Red), for all positive integers j. Such a result is not
counter-intuitive, it should be noted, or at least not in constructive concep-
tualism where in fact, for reasons already indicated, it seems to be a rather
accurate assessment of the role of identity in this framework.
Nor should the result that some non-coextensive predicative concepts have
indiscernible correlates be thought counter-intuitive either. For if F  G and
G(x) are true, then the idea that F (x) should also be true depends on the
assumption that an objects falling under a predicative concept is equivalent
to (the correlate of) that concept itself falling under a predicative concept.
What is disprovable in RRC is the somewhat di¤erent thesis:
(81x)(91F )(81G)[F (G)$ G(x)]
as well therefore as
(8x)(91F ))(81G)[F (G)$ G(x)]:
That is,the negations of these w¤s are provable in RRC + (Red), which is as
it should be, because it is counter-intuitive to demand that the construction
of a predicative concept corresponding to the condition of being a predicative
concept of a given object should both be in accordance with the vicious-
circle principle and yet occur at the same stage of concept-formation as the
predicative concept in question.
A related consequence of the reducibility axiom, incidentally, is the fact
that no relational predicative concept corresponds to, or otherwise stands
for, predication. That is,
:(91R)(81F )(8x)[R(F; x)$ F (x)]
is provable in RRC + (Red). This does not conict with the fact that at any
stage succeeding a given stage of concept-formation that is in accord with
the vicious-circle principle one can assume the construction of a relational
predicative concept that corresponds to predication at that stage; that is, it
does not conict with the fact that
(9j+1R)(81F )(8x)[R(F; x)$ F (x)]
is consistent in RRC. For what is refuted is the construction of a relational
concept of predication at the same stage of concept-formation as the stage
in question.
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Now it is noteworthy that all of these consequences of (Red) have been
discussed in somewhat di¤erent terms in the related context of the impredica-
tive theory T described in Cocchiarella [3], chapter V, §4. For if we replace
each predicate quantier 8i, for all positive integers i, by 8 in the w¤s of
RC, then it is easily seen that every theorem of RRC + (Red) is a theorem
of T. Moreover, in [3], chapter IV, §6, a strictly nitistic proof-theoretic
consistency proof is given for the system T that is easily extended to the -
abstracts of T as well. And therefore, by translating RRC
 + (Red) into T
in the way indicated, it follows that we also have a nitistic proof-theoretic
consistency proof for RRC + (Red) as well.
Theorem: RRC + (Red) is consistent and can be shown to be so in a
nitistic proof-theoretic way.
7 Holistic Conceptualism
None of the consequences of (Red) described above, it should be empha-
sized, are in conict with ramied constructive conceptualism. In fact, some
of them might even be assumed in this framework independently of any as-
sumption regarding (Red) itself. That is, aside from (Red) itself, we can for
each j  i replace 81 and 91 by 8j and 9j in several of the above conse-
quences of (Red) and take the results as valid theses of ramied constructive
conceptualism.
(Red) itself, on the other hand, as a principle about predicative concepts,
is a very implausible hypothesis. (Red) is, after all, really about predica-
tive concepts and only derivatively about the classes that are the extensions
of these concepts. In other words, that (Red) has among its consequences
an extensional impredicative comprehension principle that is useful in the
development of a theory of classes as the extensions of concepts does not
make (Red) itself any less implausible as a principle about predicative con-
cepts. In fact, given its impredicative content, (Red) really amounts to a
poor compromise between holistic conceptualism and a strict form of con-
structive conceptualism which refuses to acknowledge any concepts beyond
those that can be constructed in accordance with the vicious-circle principle.
If an impredicative comprehension principle is to be validated at all, then it
is conceptually clearer that it be validated on the basis of an idealized transi-
tion to a limit where impredicative concept-formation becomes possible than
to try to base it on predicative concepts alone. It is conceptually clearer, in
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other words, to extend RC, with or without its realist assumptions, to the
logic of holistic conceptualism than to extend it by adding (Red).
This is not the only reason for extending RC to a logic for holistic con-
ceptualism, needless to say; and, in doing so, we must again take care not
to confuse transcending the vicious-circle principle as a principle about the
process of concept-formation with violating its realist counterpart as a prin-
ciple about the positing of new objects. In fact, the logic of holistic con-
ceptualism, HC, described below as an extension RRC, is actually in full
conformity with the realist counterpart of the vicious-circle principle.
The logic of holistic conceptualism, HC, that we have in mind here is
really a simple extension of RC in which the unrestricted quantier 8 is
allowed to be a¢ xed to predicate as well as individual variables. We assume,
accordingly, that clause (7) of the denition of a meaningful expression of
type 1 is extended so that (8F )' 2 ME1 whenever ' 2 ME1 and F is a
predicate variable. In addition, besides allowing for w¤s in the newly dened
sense in all of the axiom schemes of RC other than (RCCP!), we also assume
that axioms (A1) and (A3*) and the inference rule (UG) are extended to
apply to a¢ xing the unrestricted quantier 8 to predicate variables as well
as individual variables. The system HC is then obtained by nally adding
the following impredicative comprehension principle:
(CP) (9F )([x1:::xn'] = F );
where ' is any w¤ (as newly dened) and F is an n-place predicate variable
not occurring free in '. Of course it is understood that the ramied com-
prehension principle (RCCP!) remains restricted to the w¤s of RC
, i.e., to
w¤s in which no predicate variable is bound by the unrestricted quantier 8.
Note that by (Id), (LL
) and (UG), all predicative concepts are concepts
simpliciter ; that is,
(8jG)(9F )(G = F )
is provable in HC. Accordingly, where
x 2 y =df (9F )[y = F ^ F (x)];
then we also have
x 2j y ! x 2 y
as provable in HC.
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In regard to Russells paradox, note that although we do have
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F )
as provable in HC, what follows by Russells argument is not a contradiction
but only that the predicate [x(9G)(x = G^:G(x))] is denotationless in its
nominalized occurrences as an abstract singular term. That is, instead of a
contradiction,
:(9y)([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = y)
is provable in HC. Thus what Russells argument really shows is not that
there can be no concept corresponding to [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] as a
predicate, but rather only that any denotative application of such a concept
will simply fail to denote a correlate of that concept.
Of course, since HC, like RC, is devoid of any realist assumptions at
all about the existence of objects, we can consistently add the Abelardian
thesis,
(8F ):(9x)(F = x)
to HC just as we can add its schematic counterpart to RC. All nominalized
predicates, in other words, can be assumed to be denotationless in HC.
Thus, even though the vicious-circle principle is violated or transcended here
as a principle regarding the process of concept-formation, HC need not also
thereby be committed to violating the realist counterpart of that principle.
Indeed, where RHC is the result of adding
(A10) (8jF )(9jx)(F = x); for all j 2 !   f0g:
to HC, it is clear that RHC represents a minimal form of realist holistic
conceptualism that actually is in full conformity with the realist counterpart
of the vicious-circle principle. Impredicative characterizations are not ob-
jected to as such in RHC, in other words, but only when used as a means
for positing new objects.
Now it is clear that without further realist assumptions as to which con-
cepts have correlates, such a minimal realist framework as RHC is too weak
to serve as a foundation for mathematics. Nevertheless, this does not af-
fect its status as a general conceptual framework for pursuing studies in the
foundations of mathematics, including in particular the question as to what
additional constructive principles might be justied in such a foundation.
Thus, for example, where
0 =df [x(9jF )(x = F ^ :(9y)F (y))];
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S =df [yz(9w)(w 2j z ^ [x(x 2j z ^ x 6= w)] 2j y)];
N =df [x(8F )(F (0) ^ (8y)(8z)[F (y) ^ S(y; z)! F (z)]! F (x))];
the question arises as to what constructive principles other than the vicious-
circle principle might justify assuming
(N) (9x)(N = x)
for some positive integer j. Similarly, assuming (N) and an analysis of the
real numbers based on the natural numbers, the question will also arise as to
what constructive principles (if any) will justify assuming that the concept
of a real number (as so analyzed) has a concept-correlate. (Such principles,
incidentally, might in fact be based on Wangs type-theoretical set theory
!. That is, by identifying the values of Wangs variables of type ! as the
correlates of concepts posited in a suitable extension of RHC, we might
in fact be able to provide a foundation for classical mathematics that is
constructive at least in its realist assumptions.)
Finally, although we shall not go into the details of this alternative here,
it might well be argued that we should simply drop the realist counterpart
of the vicious-circle principle as an ontological principle about the positing
of new objects and replace it instead by an epistemological principle about
the constructive knowability of the objects correlated with predicative con-
cepts. Thus, for example, where  is a modal operator for it is constructively
knowable that, we would on this proposal revise the ramied comprehension
principle (RCCP!) and its realist counterpart (A10
) by simply inserting 
after the existential posits (9jF ) and (9x), respectively, thereby enabling us
to assert instead that the predicative concept and concept-correlate being
posited in (RCCP!) and (A10
) are constructively knowable in terms of the
conditions of their specication. No such revision will apply to the impred-
icative comprehension principle (CP), on the other hand, nor to any realist
assumption (such as the principle (9=HSCP) described in [4], §15, and [5],
§7) that posits correlates even for concepts specied impredicatively. Thus,
rather than suggest that we are dealing with the construction of objects as
well as of concepts, the epistemological version of the vicious-circle principle
will make it clear that even though impredicative concepts can have concept-
correlates, it is only the correlates of predicative concepts that are construc-
tively knowable. In this way, neither impredicative concept-formation nor
a realist assumption regarding the correlates of impredicative concepts need
actually be in conict with the vicious-circle principle. In addition, such an
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epistemological version of the vicious-circle principle may also provide the
basis of an interpretation of intuitionism within conceptualism. For one of
the theses validated in conceptualism regarding constructive knowledge is
that an object will fall under a predicative concept only if it is constructively
knowable that it falls under that concept. That is, in general, where F is an
n-place predicate variable,
(K!) (8jF )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)! F (x1; :::; xn)]
is valid in conceptualism when  is interpreted as constructive knowabil-
ity. But then, because the complement of a predicative concept is also a
predicative concept, it follows that
(8jF )(8x1):::(8xn)[:F (x1; :::; xn)! :F (x1; :::; xn)]
is also valid in conceptualism; and therefore so is
(PR!) (8jF )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn) _:F (x1; :::; xn)]:
None of these principles are valid for concepts in general, needless to say;
and, according to conceptualism, it is the fact that (PR!) cannot be extended
to concepts in general that explains why the principle of excluded middle fails
in intuitionism. Constructive knowability, in other words, is the counterpart
in conceptualism of the notion of constructive provability in intuitionism.
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